Responding to the Impending Repossessions Crisis by Pryce, G.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pryce, G. (2009) Responding to the Impending Repossessions Crisis. 
Housing Analysis and Surveys Expert Panel Papers (7). Communities and 
Local Government, London, UK. 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/40393 
 
Deposited on: 18 October 2010 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper was commissioned by the Communities and Local Government  
Housing Analysis and Surveys Expert Panel 
 
The views expressed are those of the author and should not be taken as representing the 
view of Communities and Local Government. 
 © The Author 
Responding to the Impending Repossessions Crisis 
Gwilym Pryce  
Professor of Urban Economics and Social Statistics 
Department of Urban Studies 
University of Glasgow 
GlasgowG12 8RS 
Tel: 0141 330 5048 
Email: g.pryce@lbss.gla.ac.uk   
 
October 2008; minor revisions, February 2009 
 Housing Analysis and Surveys Expert Panel Papers            7   
2 
 
3 
 3 
1. Introduction  
This paper was commissioned by Communities and Local Government in November 2008 in response to 
the rise in repossessions. It addresses the macroeconomic and social impacts of repossessions and 
makes recommendations for government action. 
2. Impacts of rising repossessions  
Wealth Effect 
The following wealth effects from rising repossessions can be anticipated: 
• There is an immediate wealth effect on those repossessed and on those for whom house prices 
are depressed because of the repossessions in their locality. This is likely to have an adverse 
affect on aggregate demand via reduced equity withdrawal, though we were not sure how 
great this direct effect would be if the housing sector is already depressed.  
• The effect of macro house prices on aggregate demand is well established. For example, 
Goodhart and Hoffmann (2008) use panel data on 17 industrialised countries to assess the 
links between money, credit, house prices and economic activity. They find that, ‘(i) There is 
evidence of a significant multidirectional link between house prices, monetary variables, and 
the macroeconomy. (ii) The link between house prices and monetary variables is found to be 
stronger over a more recent sub-sample from 1985 to 2006. (iii) The effects of shocks to 
money and credit are found to be stronger when house prices are booming.’ (p. 180). See also 
Greenspan and Kennedy (2008) 
• However, the effect of repossessions on macro house prices is less well established, though 
there have been studies that have estimated the local effects (see below), and there is 
unpublished work by Baddeley (2005) that finds evidence that repossessions are part of a 
herding effect that drives house price volatility.  
Psychological and Neighbourhood Effects 
One should bear in mind that the headline macro effect may not be a good guide to the true cost to 
society (or the exchequer) of a spike in repossessions. This is because there may be impacts on 
consumer confidence, and localized effects that cause longer-term problems that are expensive to 
redress.  
• The less tangible psychological effect arises from the huge negative publicity repossessions 
attract, which is likely to further depress consumer confidence and reduce the marginal 
propensity to consume. Again, we were not sure how big the net effect of this factor would be 
if the market is already depressed.  
• In addition to the macro effects, the results of Schuetz, et al. (2008) based on on property 
sales and foreclosure filings in New York City from 2000 to 2005 provide ‘some evidence that 
the effects of foreclosures extend to neighboring property owners as well as the distressed 
borrowers themselves, which may offer a stronger justification for government intervention.’ 
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(p.20)  If clusters of repossessions precipitate neighbourhood decline, the long term social costs 
could be substantial and difficult to reverse.  Schuetz, et al. (2008) suggest a number of 
channels through which foreclosures impact on surrounding housing prices:  
1. Maintenance Externalities: ‘property owners who receive foreclosure notices may be less 
likely to maintain or upgrade their properties, either because they have less incentive to 
maintain property they may lose or because they cannot afford regular maintenance. 
Properties may start to show visible signs of neglect, which may make the surrounding 
homes less desirable.’ (p. 8)  
2. Vacancy Externalities:  ‘after completion of foreclosure proceedings and eviction of the 
delinquent borrower, the property may sit vacant and suffer further physical decline. 
Vacant properties are likely to depress surrounding property values because they 
contribute to neighborhood blight, may attract vandalism and crime, and more generally 
signal that the neighborhood is not stable. Even if the vacant properties are well 
maintained and do not attract criminal or other undesirable activities they add to the local 
supply of available units, and will thus depress property values.’ (p. 8)  
3. Ownership Structures: ‘distressed properties sold either at foreclosure auctions or pre-
foreclosure sales may be more likely to be sold to investors and become renter-occupied, 
which may lead to lower levels of maintenance even after the properties are re-occupied.’ 
(p.9)  
4. Discount effects: ‘properties with distressed loans are likely to sell at a discount – both at 
pre-foreclosure sales and at foreclosure auctions – thus affecting the price of 
“comparables” used to estimate neighboring property values’  (p. 9).  
The longer-term effects arise, for example, from the impact on crime and health:  
5. Crime: Immergluck and Smith (2006) examine the impact of foreclosures of single-family 
mortgages on crime rates at the neighborhood level in the US. They find that higher 
foreclosure levels contribute to higher levels of violent crime: “A standard deviation 
increase in the foreclosure rate (about 2.8 foreclosures for every 100 owner-occupied 
properties in one year) corresponds to an increase in neighborhood violent crime of 
approximately 6.7 per cent.”   
6. Health: Nettleton and Burrows (1998) argue that ‘the consequences of mortgage 
indebtedness are likely to have profound psychosocial consequences for those who have 
direct experience of it’ (p.731). They find that in the UK, ‘mortgage indebtedness has an 
independent effect on the subjective well being of men and women, and that it increases 
the likelihood that men will visit their general practitioners.’ (p.731).  However, 
methodological complexities make it ‘difficult to judge the extent to which poor health is 
caused by the onset of mortgage indebtedness or whether those with worsening health are 
more likely to find themselves in difficulty’ (pp.745-746). More recent research, however, 
appears to arrive at firmer conclusions: 
‘For male heads of households housing payment problems and entering 
arrears have significant detrimental effects on mental well-being and for 
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female heads of households longer-term housing payment problems and 
arrears have significant detrimental effects on mental well-being. The sizes of 
these effects are in addition to and larger in magnitude than those associated 
with financial hardship more generally. The net effects appear to be 
relatively stable over the time of the panel data... This study provides 
evidence that housing payment problems have independent psychological 
costs over and above those associated with general financial hardship. The 
magnitude of the effect is similar to that shown for marital breakdown and 
job loss.’ (Taylor, et al., 2007, p.1027). 
Impact on the Relative Benefits of Homeownership 
Volatile repossessions may reduce the benefits of homeownership for low-income households relative to 
wealthier households by (i) increasing the Negative ratchet effects for the poor; (ii) lead to a less 
favourable risk/return trade-off; and (iii) lead to higher costs of borrowing for the poor. There may 
therefore be a case for dampening the amplitude of the repossessions cycle. These are under-
researched themes (based on Pryce, 2008, and Pryce and Sprigings, 2009), and so should be viewed 
as conjectures, albeit potentially important ones. 
(1) Negative ratchet effects for the poor? 
Consider the following hypothetical example. Assume that a person typically faces 4 housing cycles 
over the course of their 40 year housing career – i.e. a housing boom every 10 years. Each of these 
cycles is broken into 2 periods: upswing & downswing, yielding a total of 8 intervals connecting 9 time 
points: t1 to t9. Assume that the price of a given type of house = £80,000 in t1, = £280,000 in t9. For 
sake of simplicity, assume also that rental costs = mortgage costs = £3,000 per year;   i.e. a total of 
£120,000 over 40 years, and that RPI = 0 (or that the calculations are in real terms). 
Now suppose there are 3 types of person: 
• Person A: enters OO at t1 and stays in OO until t9 
• Person B: enters OO in slumps and leaves during booms; 
• Person C: enters OO in booms and leaves during slumps 
The scenario facing Person A, who stays in owner occupation from t1 to t9, is depicted in Figure 1. 
Their Gross Revenue by the end of their housing career = £280,000-£80,000 = £200,000. Now take 
away rental/mortgage costs of £120,000 to leave a Net Profit of £80,000, assuming no transactions 
costs. 
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Figure 1: Person A 
 
For Person B (Figure 2), who enters OO during slumps, leaves during peaks, the housing cycle is a way 
of ratcheting up additional gains. She buys low and sells high, leading to Gross Revenue = £70,000 in 
t1t2 +£70,000 in t3t4 +£70,000 in t5t6 +£70,000 in t7t8 = £280,000. Now take away 
rental/mortgage costs of £120,000 to leave a Net Profit of £160,000 assuming no transactions costs. 
So, even though Person B faces exactly the same house price trajectory as Person A, she makes twice 
as much profit. 
Figure 2: Person B 
 
Now consider Person C (Figure 3). He enters OO during booms, and leaves during slumps, and so the 
housing cycle becomes a mechanism for ratcheting-up significant losses. He buys high and sells low, 
leading to Gross Revenue = -£20,000 in t2t3 -£20,000 in t4t5 -£20,000 in t6t7 -£20,000 in t8t9 = -
£160,000. Now take away rental/mortgage costs of £120,000, and person C has made a Net loss of 
£280,000, assuming no transactions costs. So, even though Person C faces exactly the same house price 
trajectory as Person A and Person B, he makes a significant loss compared to their significant profits. 
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Figure 3: Person C 
 
How does a cycle of volatile repossession rates imply a Person C type negative ratchet effect for low-
income households?  
The effect arises from the coincidence of housing, credit and employment cycles. During a housing 
slump, house prices are low, but you can’t buy unless you have a large deposit because credit market 
also in a slump. Only the cash-rich can take advantage of low house prices (i.e. if you are cash rich you 
are more likely to be able to choose the Person B pattern of purchase).  But because the housing slump 
coincides with the employment slump, if you already own, you more likely to face unemployment, 
particularly if you are in unskilled or semi-skilled work.  During a housing boom, credit market are also 
in a boom; lax lending practices such as 100% mortgages, entices low income/high-risk households into 
home ownership at the worst possible time in the housing cycle. 
So if you are low-skilled, low income, and asset/cash poor, you are more likely to be subject to the 
purchase pattern of Person C.  
As noted, this is an under-researched area, but note that Boehm and Schlottmann (2004) find in the US 
‘a high likelihood that lower income families will “slip” back to renting after attaining homeownership’ 
(p. 128). They conclude that, “To the extent that low-income and/or minority families are unable to 
adjust their level of consumption of owned housing freely and may even have a high likelihood of 
returning to rental tenure, homeownership may be less beneficial than it otherwise might be” (Boehm 
and Schlottmann 2004 p.129).  
Note that our hypothetical example does not take into account the high transactions costs associated 
with moving in and out of home-ownership solicitors’ fees, mortgage arrangement charges, estate 
agent charges, survey costs, Stamp Duty the size of these costs probably larger in relative terms for 
low earners.  
An important potential consequence of a repossession cycle of large amplitude is that it may create 
asymmetries in the relative returns to homeownership for different social groups.  
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(ii) Less favourable risk/return trade-off? 
These asymmetries will be greater still if there are neighbourhood/spatial impacts of repossessions of 
the kind discussed by Schuetz, et al. (2008) and others. This is because it may affect the risk/return 
trade-off. Even if poor and rich areas have the same mean trajectory for house prices, there may be a 
wider span of trajectories in low-income areas (as depicted in Figure 5).  
Figure 4: Wider Span of Trajectories for Poor Areas 
 
Results from Levin and Pryce (2008), presented in Figure 5, provide initial evidence that this may 
indeed be the case, with an apparently wider spectrum of price appreciation for low house price 
areas compared with high house price areas (though more work is needed to verify whether this is a 
genuine effect or the result of non-constant error variance caused by variations in the number of 
observations in each geographical unit). 
Figure 5 Greater Spectrum of Price Appreciation for Low House Price Areas 
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Even if poor and rich areas have the same mean trajectory, there may be greater volatility for a given 
trajectory (as in Figure 6) particularly if repossessions during slumps are concentrated in poor areas. 
Figure 6: Does Spatial Clustering of Repossessions Lead to Asymmetric House Price Volatility? 
 
(iii) Higher costs of borrowing? 
A spike in repossessions will lead to impaired credit ratings for large numbers of people. This in turn 
will lead to higher costs of borrowing for these individuals for many years to come. Differentials in 
borrowing costs will further exacerbate the asymmetries in relative returns to home ownership across 
different social groups. 
These three arguments: that a volatile repossession cycle may reduce the benefits of homeownership 
for low-income households relative to wealthier households by:  
(i) increasing the Negative ratchet effects for the poor;  
(ii) lead to a less favourable risk/return trade-off; and  
(iii) lead to higher costs of borrowing for the poor.  
add further weight to the case for dampening the amplitude of the repossessions cycle.  
Destabilising Effect on Financial Institutions 
Probably more important than any of these effects, however, at least in the short to medium term, is the 
risk that a significant rise in repossessions could further destabilize the UK banking system. The current 
credit crunch has arisen because of a crisis in the US subprime sector that became apparent around 
two years ago which subsequently revealed and exacerbated fragilities in the entire world financial 
system. If repossessions rise significantly (and there is a chance they will) we could end up with a 
second round to the credit crunch in the UK, this time of our own making, and see further bank 
failures/rescues ensuing. This could prolong and deepen the recession. Significant intervention to 
minimize the increase in mortgage repossession is justified to reduce the risk of financial 
destabilization.  
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3. What should the government do?  
The focus should be on bailing out mortgage borrowers rather than bailing out the banks directly. If 
mortgage borrowers are protected, then this in itself will stabilize the banks.  
ISMI and its limitations: 
Returning ISMI its pre-1987 as a temporary measure (both in terms of reducing the waiting period, 
and in terms of paying full interest incurred rather than a standard rate) would fit with this view, 
though it should be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for rescuing the mortgage sector. 
ISMI alone will not be enough because many of those at risk will not be eligible for income support, 
ISMI only covers interest payments (it does not cover amortization), and borrowers may have 
accumulated huge unsecured debts (credit card debt) not covered by ISMI. So banks may still 
repossess even if someone is on a fully restored ISMI system.  
Expand Mortgage to Rent 
We would advocate a significant extension of Mortgage to Rent Schemes, perhaps by setting up a 
national state-owned company (called Property Holdings for Mortgage to Rent– PHMR – for sake of 
argument) to purchase properties, but to pay local letting agencies, housing companies and Housing 
Associations to manage the tenancies. This might be a way of getting round one of the limitations of 
current schemes: i.e. that housing associations (HAs) will only take on a foreclosed property it if fits with 
their long term investment strategy. By separating the ownership and management functions, a more 
rapid expansion of the scheme could be achieved. PHMR could be developed as a Real Estate 
Investment Trust so that, once the crisis is over, this state owned national company PHMR could be sold 
on the stock exchange to recover costs (in the spirit of the Resolution Trust Corporation1 set up as a way 
of helping to resolve to the US Savings and Loans Crisis).  
The process implied by this suggestion is depicted graphically in Figure 7 below. Note that Local 
Authorities and Housing Associations would be offered first refusal on the purchase of these properties 
– PHMR acts as purchaser of last resort. 
                                                 
1 Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) was set up to help liquidate failing Savings and Loans (S&L) companies (the US 
equivalents of UK Buildings Societies) in the early 1990s. Mortgage loans and other assets were transferred from the 
bankrupt S&Ls to the RTC and then sold on at relatively modest net overall costs to the taxpayer. See Davison (2005) and 
Economist (2008) for more details. 
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Figure 7: Extending Mortgage to Rent 
 
 
Reforming Mark-to-Market: Breaking the Downward Spiral 
Government needs to be aware of the incentives implied to lenders of falling house prices. If prices are 
expected to continue falling for a prolonged period, lenders have an incentive to speed the 
repossession process to minimize losses on resale.  
* PHMR = Property Holdings for Mortgage to Rent–– national state-owned, state-
financed, set up to purchase properties owned by mortgage borrowers who would 
otherwise default, and which have been declined by HAs and LAs. 
Borrower goes into 
Arrears 
ISMI  
+ Lender restructures mortgage to 
reduce risk of default 
Forbearance  
if ISMI and debt 
restructuring fail 
Property purchased by PHMR*, State owned 
company 
if no HA or LA willing to purchase 
+ Property managed by local HA  
in return for a fee  from PHMR funded from rent 
Property offered for sale to 
HAs, LAs etc. 
if forbearance fails 
Once the housing crises is over,  
PHMR floated on the stock exchange 
& government recoups losses/makes 
profit due to rise in house prices 
12 
 12 
The situation is made significantly worse by ‘The Paradox of Deleveraging’  (McCulley 2008): the 
tightening of loan criteria by lenders causes an initial inward shift of the demand for housing, and 
prices fall. But this has 2nd and 3rd round effects. The fall in prices caused by the stricter loan criteria 
mean that the value of the collateral underpinning lender balance sheets falls, so leveraging actually 
rises. Even stricter loan criteria are then imposed in an attempt to deleverage. And so the downward 
spiral continues. 
Central to this vicious circle is the use of the Mark-to-Market method of asset valuation. Tying lender 
balance sheets to current prices is destabilizing because house prices can overshoot – they deviate 
from their fundamental ‘true’ value. As Levin (2008) argues:  
‘Macroeconomic instability occurs when all banks are obliged to sell their assets at 
the same time in order to restore their liquidity and maintain their solvency. 
Simultaneous action of this nature reduces the market price of assets, which in turn 
further destroys banks’ equity. As a result, banks are forced to sell even more 
assets and restrict lending, causing a systemic downwards spiral in stock prices and 
house prices. Private investors, observing the trend, join in as they likewise seek to 
limit their losses. This downward spiral leads to negative asset price bubbles in both 
the stock market and the house market. But stocks and mortgages hold real value 
that may be undervalued as market prices are driven below fundamental values in 
the general rush to liquidate assets during a period when no-one is willing “to catch 
a falling knife”… (Levin 2008, p.2) 
Mark-to-market based valuation of banks’ assets declined in 2008 because the 
market was illiquid, and markets were illiquid because banks’ assets on marking-to-
market valuation were falling. A vicious circle associated with marking-to-market 
exacerbated the asset valuation problem initially triggered by a downturn in the 
housing market caused by sub-prime lending and excessive leverage. The 
downward spiral of asset values based on marking-to-market transformed the 
2008 banking liquidity crisis into a crisis of uncertainty as to how to distinguish 
between banks facing problems of insolvency rather than liquidity.’ (Levin 2008, 
p.4) 
Instability increases the incentives for lenders to jettison apparently bad debt, putting added pressure 
to raise foreclosure rates. Unless the instability implied by the current mark-to-market rules are 
addressed, any intervention by government could be akin to swimming against the tide. 
We suggest, therefore, urgent revision of the mark-to-market system. It would be far better that banks 
use as their measure of the current value of collateral a gauge that is based on the fundamental asset 
value of housing, rather than the current trading value. Levin (2008) proposes an extension of the 
accepted bench-mark user cost approach to house valuation that incorporates expected house price 
appreciation as an endogenous variable.  
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Encourage the Development of Financial Contracts that will oil the wheels of 
housing market recovery. 
Kaivanto et al (2008) have proposed the use of financial innovations to help break a second type of 
downward spiral – one that arises due to loss aversion. The following is based on/taken from that 
proposal. 
Kaivanto et al (2008) argue that the reduced volume of transactions currently being witnessed in the 
housing market can partly be attributed to a failure in the current set of financial products to address 
asymmetries between buyers and sellers in future returns.  
‘House owners (mortgage payers) resist lowering nominal asking and closing prices, 
and they resist realising a net financial loss, i.e. they resist locking into a negative 
equity position  
One driver of this asymmetry is the belief that the housing market will recover from 
the current downswing. However in the terminology of behavioural economics house 
owners also display the disposition effect, whereby they persist in holding on to loss-
making positions for too long. This is due to both: 
1. the unwillingness to realise or ‘lock into’ losses or negative equity (people are 
loss averse); and 
2. the belief that house prices will ‘recover soon’ and that by just holding on a 
bit longer the whole situation will turn right (people are subject to the local 
representativeness effect and the gambler’s fallacy  whereby they expect a 
reversal to occur in their favour sooner than justified on purely objective 
grounds).’ (p.3) 
In principle it should be possible to devise contracts that require no ‘subsidy’ from either government or 
lenders, but which are attractive to the prospective buyers and sellers because they unlock a zone of 
possible agreement, to be shared fairly between the contracting parties, by the introduction of risk 
sharing between the buyer and seller.  
One obvious means of achieving this would be to devise a contract that allows sellers to concede a 
lower immediate closing price in exchange for a fair division of the proceeds of the property’s 
subsequent price development with the buyer.  
There is good reason to expect that such ‘risk sharing contracts’ could relax the asymmetry in house 
price flexibility as well as increase volume and liquidity in housing markets.  
Such contracts could, for instance, be made available to mortgage holders who are in arrears, but are 
holding on in the hope of not locking into negative equity. Under such a contract, even though the 
property were placed on the market ‘priced to sell’ in the current climate, the seller would subsequently 
recoup, say, two years hence an amount equal to one-half of the difference between the market value 
of the property and the previously agreed closing price. This would allow the financially vulnerable 
homeowner to avoid repossession and the associated impaired credit rating.  
14 
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Buyers, on the other hand, would benefit under this contract structure from (a) the availability of a 
mortgage given this arrangement, and (b) a lower closing price for the property than in the absence of 
this contract form.  
The 50%–50% split between buyer and seller is potentially important insofar as it is the touchstone of 
‘fairness’ in contracting, and therefore crucial to unlocking the barriers to acceptance of such a ‘new’ 
and unfamiliar contract.  
There are numerous ways in which such a contract might be designed and implemented in practice. 
One possibility might be to ‘roll it into’ the mortgage contract. For practical implementation it would be 
necessary to develop this collaboratively with a mortgage lender. As a working concept, however, we 
believe that the risk sharing element would technically need to be implemented by making reference to 
a property price index. This would eliminate the natural concern for possible moral hazard – i.e. the 
new owner not taking due care of the property with the consequence of diminished value. It would also 
permit a structure whereby the closing price includes an amount with which a two-year option is 
purchased on the property index, the proceeds of which, when the option is exercised two years hence, 
are disbursed to the seller. With this implementation, the buyer does not face uncertainty in the 
principal (and the affordability) of her mortgage.  
For the mortgage lender, a distinct business case can be made for developing risk sharing mortgage 
contracts. Firstly, this contract form can be a source of competitive advantage to the first mover 
mortgage lender(s) insofar as house sellers and buyers find the contract attractive. Moreover, insofar 
as risk sharing mortgage contracts can improve liquidity in the housing market and reduce the number 
of repossessions, the risk of a dramatic collapse of the housing market is reduced and thereby the 
value of mortgage lenders’ mortgage books (or securitisations thereof) are enhanced and rendered 
less fragile.  
Similar proposals are currently being considered by the Federal Housing Association in the USA in an 
attempt to restore liquidity to the American mortgage market (see Ross, 2008).  
4. Conclusions 
Following from the preceding discussion, the following actions should be encouraged by the 
government: 
• Lenders should be encouraged to practice greater forbearance, particularly for ISMI 
claimants. 
• A mortgage to rent scheme should be extended by establishing a state corporation, the 
Property Holdings for Mortgage to Rent (PHMR) to act as purchaser of last resort. 
• A requirement should be introduced for lenders not to repossess properties until housing 
associations, local authorities and the proposed PHMR state corporation have had the 
opportunity to purchase, possibly at discounted rates.  
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• There should be a shift away from valuing lenders assets at current market prices (‘mark-to-
market’) and towards prices that are based on their more stable underlying value (Levin 
2008). 
• Lenders should co-operate with government on exploring the development of financial 
products to kick-start the market. 
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